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1 Introduction
The availability of information is crucial for e¢ cient decision making by cit-
izens and consumers (Stigler 1961, Stiglitz 2000). For the voter, information
about government actions and political candidates is essential for accurate
voting choices. On the other hand, consumers and investors require informa-
tion to purchase products and securities. Access to information is, however,
circumscribed by the instruments that are made available to the citizen. Less
developed economies particularly su¤er from the lack of adequate commu-
nications technologies. While access to communications infrastructure, and
thus information, is largely asserted to be a prerequisite for growth and
productivity, and its absence a severe impediment, there is little empirical
evidence which establishes this fact. This paper empirically investigates the
role of Information Communications Technologies and mass media as instru-
ments of access to information, and their e¤ect on economic growth and
development.
In most countries, citizens and consumers receive most of their informa-
tion they need through the media, which comprise newspapers, television,
and radio. The other recent technology which has revolutionised the trans-
mission of information has been the incidence of mobile phones and the spread
of the internet. Mass media and new technological revolutions in telephony
and Information and Communications Technologies (hereafter ICT) comprise
the two main vehicles of information in modern societies. While the spread
and the nature of the information transfered to the citizens of a country are
highly dependent upon the nature of ownership of the media (state or prvi-
ately owned), that made available to citizens via the ICT or the weightless
economy1 are less (or not at all) susceptible to any biases in the information
provided.
Developing countries, with underdeveloped and imperfect markets are the
more susceptible to drawbacks of the lack of information availability. Typi-
cally poor in equipment investment and infrastructure (of varying degrees),
and underdeveloped media bodies, both consumers and citizens remain un-
derinformed about economic activities and the political markets. Increased
1The term "weightless economy", popularised by Quah (2001a, b) comprise knowl-
edge based products: computer software, new media, electronic databases and libraries,
and Internet delivery of goods and services. These elements of the weightless economy
are knowledge-products, not necessarily because they are knowledge intensive in produc-
tion, but because their physical properties resemble those of knowledge. The economy is
knowledge intensive, not just because of the quantity of knowledge used in production,
but because of the quantity of knowledge-products consumed. In this paper though, the
weightless economy with reference to developing countries, applies to mainly ICT pene-
tration.
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telephony and ICT penetration, and media penetration and/or deregulation
of the media are frequent policy levers discussed by both academics and pol-
icy makers alike. Studies have already identied strong links between media
development and other development indicators, such income per capita and
literacy. Likewise, high telephony and ICT penetration is a characteristic of
developed economies.
What this seems to suggest is that there may be signicant costs to having
underdeveloped media and ICT in that it restricts information availability.
That this may a¤ect economic growth and development in LDCs is of con-
cern, particularly in light of the increasing divide between the rich and poor
countries. This paper empirically tests for the e¤ects of both ICT/Telephony
and media development on various economic development outcomes.
There are long standing concerns about the nature of such technologies
impact on the economy; in particular, how they individually impact upon
the short run (and medium to long run) development and growth outcomes.
Of the two (i.e. media and ICT), the impact of ICT and telephony, like any
other new technology, is a double edged innovation - one which results in both
driving economic growth but also likely to result in increasing spatial and in-
dividual inequalities. While increasing returns and technological progress are
conceptually distinct, both theory and evidence seem to suggest that they
often come together and result in technological lock-in (David 1985), such
that technologies that have an initial advantage, tend to endure. Promi-
nent theories on the sources of economic growth reinforce such concerns. The
"weightless" properties of such technologies, with little regard for geograph-
ical barriers (Quah 2001a, b) enhance their rapid spread, thus on the one
hand enhancing adoption, but on the other hand, due to unequal adoption
rates, are predisposed to result in rapid increases in spatial and individual
inequalities. Thus, in an LDC context, an urban growth/concentration in
telephony and ICT penetration is highly likely to wedge the urban and the
rural areas apart, as much as push the rich and the poor individuals apart
as well. The Indian economy is an apposite example where the introduction
of (mobile) telephony and ICTs has adversely a¤ected spatial and individ-
ual inequalities - regions, cities, quick in adoption of the new technologies
have experienced the development of local (albeit very scattered and small)
clusters of productivity. Skill-biased technologies such as those engendered
by development of ICT may also result in high wage inequalities - studies on
the US increasing wage gap evince that skill-biased technological change (as
a consequence of the increasing computerisation of the US work force) is an
important driving force of US wage inequality (Autor and Katz 1999, Goldin
and Katz 1996, DiNardo and Pischke 1994).
The impact of mass media however is less selective on its target audience
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and not likely to directly accentuate spatial or individual inequalities in the
manner ICTs do. In its various forms - newspapers, radios and television -
mass media evens out asymmetries in information being available to citizens.
However, its development and penetration is endogenous in a manner that
ICT is not - the quality of news generated by the media industry is also
strongly dependent of how the government treats the media indutry. Media
penetration is dependent upon the nature of democracy, as well as if it exists
at all. Data from Polity IV2 suggests that countries which are rated more
democratic have higher levels of media penetration as measured by newspaper
circulation and television ownership. There is evidence of strong positive
correlations between media penetration and measures of press freedom from
Freedom House. Deeper media penetration, unlike ICT, has no unequal
e¤ects in its impact. On the other hand, underdevelopment of media is often
a consequence of governments attempting to evade scrutiny frommal-delivery
or non-delivery of public goods, or government failure. Mass media functions
to enhance citizensabilities to scrutinise government actions.
Given these debates, there is still little evidence on the impact of ICT and
media development in developing countries and their consequences. This pa-
per aims to ll this gap by providing some robust evidence of the positive
impact of mass media penetration and ICT/mobile telephony. The paper dis-
cusses the impact of ICT and mass media on three development observables:
corruption, inequality and poverty. The results provide strong evidence that
higher mass media penetration (newspapers, radio and TV ownership) is as-
sociated with lower corruption. They are also robustly associated with lower
inequality. The results for poverty suggest strong evidence for the impact of
mass media (that it is associated with lower poverty), though ICT/telephony
is not found to be robustly associated.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the current
literature relating to media penetration and ICT/telephony penetration is
discussed. Section 3 discusses the data and presents the empirical strategy
and the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Mass Media and ICT
.
2http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/Polity.html, also cited in Besley et al (2002b)
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2.1 Political Accountability
The rise of mass media as an indispensible accessory of modern societys
access to information has been phenomenal. Mass media, through radios,
televisions, and newspapers, is the principal tool for the citizens to hold
the governments accountable for their actions. Most importantly, it is the
only vehicle which carries information about government actions. The rise
of the popularity of the internet and cyberinformation has been the recent
addition to the three main media instruments. In a democratic framework, it
is essential that the citizens have access to information about the government
to be able to select the appropriate government into power (in the presence
of free elections) who will serve their needs, and vote out of power those who
do not serve their needs. This is particularly important in less developed
economies where the poor are particularly dependent on government actions.
That said, mass media are not neutral devices. Di¤erent mass-media
technologies change the target group of who has access to political informa-
tion. This is crucial for developing country citizens, where the incidence of
di¤erent kinds of media varies tremendously. On the other hand, ownership
of the media body is a crucial determinant of the nature of the information
provided - privately owned media bodies may well distort the information
provided (or the contrary), or leave citizens underinformed of government
actions. Under repressive political regimes, similar instances may happen
with public media bodies. The e¤ective publication and the credibility of
the information, i.e the publication of real information, will depend upon the
nature of the media body - whether it is captured, regulated or repressed.
Thus di¤erent bodies of mass media create di¤erent sets of informed and
uninformed citizens.
2.1.1 Political Mechanism
Despite the obvious justications that mass media creates a more educated
and thus responsive citizen, and that it ensures governments are more ac-
countable to citizens, it is only recently that the political economy literature
has seriously begun to address these issues. There is a growing literature
focusing on political agency problems. While most countries have media in
some form of the other, does not guarantee it as a successful vehicle of in-
formation - for that to be achieved, one requires the appropriate vehicles of
information, that will publish information on these issues. This is a¤ected by
a variety of government actions - ranging from policy decisions a¤ecting the
regulation and of entry and ownership of media on the one hand, to bribery
and threats to the media bodies. Besley and Prat (2001) study the determi-
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nants and the consequences of captured media, and looking at cross-country
data on media ownership nd that capture is more likely if there is more state
ownership of newspapers and there is greater concentration in ownership of
newspapers.
2.1.2 Corruption
The existence of an active mass media body, is usually seen to be associated
with an active democracy - citizens are free to have access to information
about their politicians. A small but growing cross country literature connects
the incidence of a free press and the political framework that accompanies
it. There are countries which though democratic in structure, have low press
freedom - such is typically the case for developing countries. Brunetti (2003)
and Ahrend (2002) nds robust correlations between press freedom and cor-
ruption. Djankov et al. (2003) also uncover robust cross-country evidence of
state ownership of the media to be negatively correlated with a number of
measures of good governance. Using a panel of 16 Indian states, 1958-1992,
Besley and Burgess (2001) nd that Indian state governmentsprovision of
public food and calamity relief expenditure is more responsive to falls in food
production and crop ood damage in states where newspaper circulation is
high. The role of media in moderating business cycles is examined by Shi and
Svensson (2002) - using a panel of 123 developed and developing countries
over a 21-year period, Shi and Svensson indeed nd larger political budget
cycles in countries where few people have radios.
Greater media outlets on the other hand are found to be encouraging for
the emergence of a free press (Besley, Burgess and Prat 2002). Competition,
though, may result in two di¤erent e¤ects. While Besley and Prat argue that
more media outlets are an impediment to politicians trying bribe the media,
Mullianathan and Shleifer (2003) argue that greater competition could result
in newspapers (or other media forms) to print or broadcast stories which
conrm readersprior opinions than present the real facts.
2.2 The E¤ect of ICT
The impact of ICT is of particular interest as an information carrier because
of the nature of the technology it embodies. While, on the one hand, it is a
principal carrier of information, serving to even out asymmetries in informa-
tion that may exist in markets and society in general, its e¤ect on economic
development is more tangible than that of mass media - ICT carries with it
technology that directly a¤ects economic productivity and growth.
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2.2.1 Growth
Increased investment in ICT has led to signicant increases in economic
growth - studies on investment in ICTs in industrialised countries (Haacker
and Morsinck 2002) estimate an average increase in total factor productivity
growth by just over one third percentage point per year over 1995 - 2000.
Of course, cross-country variations exist. The US, for instance, has had a
projected increase in TFP by one half percentage point per year. Europes
experience with ICTs contribution to economic growth is relatively sporadic.
Between 1995-2000, Daveris studies (2002) reveal that ICT contributions to
growth were signicant in only 10 countries (out of 14). In only 6 of these,
was ICT related capital-deepening associated with greater aggregate total
factor productivity or growth in labour productivity. Of the newly industri-
alised economies in East Asia, the deepening of ICT has been of signicant
importance, particularly in production - 28% of their manufacturing exports
are ICT products (Kenny 2003). The contribution of ICT related capital-
deepening in Japan, contributed to increasing growth by one half to three
quarters. In some regions however, estimation of the e¤ects of ICT on growth
are unavailable. In regions of South Asia (barring India) the Middle East and
Africa, there is not enough data available for a growth accounting analysis.
Likewise, in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, ICT investments
are too small to measure their impact on economic growth (Piatkowski 2002),
warranting greater research and data collection in this area.
2.2.2 Inequality
The factors determining the e¤ects of ICT and mobile telephony penetra-
tion on prospects of economic development are multifaceted. On the one
hand, like various forms of mass media, it functions as an information car-
rier: carrying information related to both the market, and local and global
society. This is particularly so for the case of the internet and cyberinfor-
mation.What prominently distinguishes the outcomes of ICT penetration as
distinctly di¤erent from other forms of information carriers is that on the
production front it is pervasively characterised by increasing returns. Arthur
(1994) and Krugman (1991) emphasise that the predominance of increasing
returns in a certain industry leads to spatial agglomeration, in a manner sim-
ilar to how technological lock-in sets in. Thus, the greater the clustering, the
greater spatial inequality. From this point of view, ICT is no di¤erent from
other industries - the concentration and the location of geographical clusters
reect simply the high skilled and fast-producing nature of the technology,
like many other industries. ICT clustering is more pronounced in the EU
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than in the US (Koski et al 2000, Quah 2001a), though there are no studies
which investigate the determinants of di¤erential clustering across the two
continents.
While this works at the level of the industry and results in spatial agglom-
eration, a similar process may function at the individual level - unequal access
to ICT, and thus information, may exacerbate already exisiting individual
inequalities. This depends upon individual access to ICT, cyberinformation
and mobile telephony. Interestingly, ICT and telephony communications are
experiencing faster growth-rates in low-income countries more than twice
as fast as in the high-income countries in recent years (Coyle 2004). Coyle
(2004) points out that the phenomenon of the rapid spread of mobile tele-
phony cuts across many obvious characteristics such as GDP per capita,
socio-demographic or geographic criteria - thus Finland and Uganda have
a similar proportion of mobile-only users but are not sensibly comparable
countries. Thus, while there are concerns of unequal adoption of ICT result-
ing in possible unequal access to information, this may be an e¤ect which
will quell in due course due to fast adoption in LDCs. Due to the recentness
of the phenomenon and the lack of adequate data, this is yet to have been
investigated empirically and will be attempted in the empirical section of this
paper with data currently available.
Combining all these issues, one is prompted to ask whether ICT invest-
ment is just growth spurring or inequality increasing, or both. Some casual
empiricism as discussed above suggests both, but it is yet to be empirically
established. ICTs growth-inducing-inequality-increasing e¤ect is character-
istic of new technology. While the phenomenon of spatial agglomeration
(thus leading to spatial inequalities) is clearly understood in the literature,
whether it is associated with increasing individual inequalities is not clear.
There have been no studies that investigate the e¤ect of ICT on individual
inequality. The empirical analysis that follows attempts to uncover any such
correlations (and causality) between various development outcomes discussed
above and ICT.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
This section discusses the data on ICT, media press freedom and corruption,
inequality and poverty, discusses the specications tested in the empirical
analysis, and explains the econometric methodology used. The database has
been put together from a variety of sources, each to be described in turn.
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3.1 Measures of Mass Media Penetration
Mass media penetration is measured by using the number of newspapers in
circulation, and the ownership of radios and televisions. The principal data
source has been the World Bank Indicators data base.
3.2 Measures of ICT and Mobile Telephony
The data has been compiled from the World Bank indicators data set (2004).
The variables for which we have obtained maximum coverage of countries are
the following:
-Mobile phones
-Internet Users per 1,000 people
-ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP
-Fax machines (per 1,000 people)
-Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)
-Telephone mainlines per employee
-Telephone revenue (per 1,000 people)
-Number of personal computers per 100,000 people.
Though there exists a large number of other ICT indicators, the country
coverage dramatically drops, and are thus not included in the analysis.
To identify the collective e¤ect of the ICT variables, we construct an
index of ICT using factor analysis. This technique is a method of data
reduction and attempts to describe the indicators as linear combinations of
a small number of latent variables. We accept the rst factor (f1, which
we will call INFRA) to be the general index of infrastructure, which takes
an eigenvalue of over 5, results for which are omitted from the paper for
brevity. In performing the factor analysis, the data has been normalised for
comparability of the numerical values (for example, comparing revenues in
US dollars to number of personal computers per 1,000 people). This explains
the values of f1 and f2 taking negative values in the non-parametric plots in
Figures 2 and 3, to be introduced later in the empirical analysis.
3.3 Measure of press freedom
Our main measure of press freedom is assembled by Freedom House, having
published widely used indexes for political rights and civil liberties for the
last 25 years. For robustness we will also use data from other organisations,
namely Reporters Without Borders. Here again the data presented is in the
form of a ranking of the countries in increasing order of freedom. The tests
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performed in the empirical section below will test with both variables of press
freedom.
There are a growing body of studies on the nature of media ownership,
determinants of media capture (Djankov et al 2003, Petrova 2005). This
paper entirely focuses on establishing the relationship between the existence
of the knowledge-economy infrastructures (media and ICTs) and their cor-
relations with a number of development outcomes - corruption, inequality
and poverty. Connecting these outcomes to the multi-faceted aspects of the
nature and ownership of mass media entails a much broader research agenda,
warranting a separate study altogether. These issues are thus not addressed
in this empirical study with the view of establishing the nature of the corre-
lations, and if they exist at all.
3.4 Measure of corruption
Our main measure of corruption is an indicator collected by the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG): these are annual ratings of corruption levels by
using surveys in the respective countries. The indicator ranges from 0 to
6. Of all country risk services ICRG covers by far the largest number of
countries.
3.5 Results
We will rst present the results with corruption as the dependent variable,
tabulated in Table 1. Table 2 presents the results with inequality (Ginis)
and Table 3 with poverty as the dependent variable. Main specications we
are testing for are:
CORRi = 0 + 1MEDIAi + 3ICT indexi + i (1)
We also then look at a much broader specication, where other determi-
nants of corruption along with the two main explanatory variables are given
as follows.
CORRi = 0 + 1MEDIAi + 3ICT indexi + 4RULEi + 5TRADEi
+6BLACKi + 7ETHNICi + i (2)
A short discussion of the controls. Rule of law, in the tables as RULE,
is a variable obtained from the ICRG, which measures the extent of the
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citizenscapabilities to monitor the extent of corruption. It hence represents
the presence of sound political institutions, a functional legal system and
"provisions for an orderly succession of power". BUREAU accounts for the
quality of bureaucracy in the government, also provided by the ICRG based
on evaluations from country experts. It indicates the degree of autonomy (of
the bureaucracy) from political pressure.
TRADE and BLACK are proxies for distortions and restrictions of com-
petition in an economy. TRADE measures the exposure of an economy to
foreign trade and is dened as the sum of exports and imports as a percent-
age of GDP. It has been argued that open countries are subject to larger
competitive pressure which reduces monopolistic rents and thus corruption
(Ades and Di Tella 1999). BLACK measures the black market premium on
foreign exchange and is used in the literature as an indicator of the degree
of government-created distortions in an economy. ETHNIC measures the
degree of ethnolinguistic diversity which proxies for the cultural variation
across the countries.
Other country specic controls are also included. GDP and Literacy
measure the level of per capita GDP in 1990 (calculated at purchasing power
parity), and the educational attainment. These both act as proxies for ex-
ternal controls - higher levels of GDP and education serve to act as a control
on corruption by creating greater awareness. Table 1 lists the sources of the
variables.
OLS regressions in Table 2 highlight the relationship between corruption
and the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the corruption
measure from ICRG. We use an average of this index (19941998) in order
to match the timing with our main measures of mass media and the index
of Tel/ICT. We use OLS for our estimations, as the dependent variable is
a continuous variable. Various robustness tests are undertaken. We split
the sample into developed and less developed countries to observe whether
relationship is driven by LDCs, or othter outliers. We also use other measures
of corruption and press freedom data for robustness. All t statistics are robust
to heteroscedasticity in residuals. The controls used in this specication are
those established in Brunetti and Weder (2003), in addition to the others
which are relevant to the analysis.
Column 1 in Table 2 provides the base specication, as detailed above.
We obtain a negative and signicant coe¢ cient for all newspapers, radio and
televisions. Both controls are also positive and signicant at the 1% level.
This indicates that, as expected, corruption is lower in countries with a well-
working bureaucracy and in countries with a well-established rule of law. The
base specication explains 68% of the variation in the corruption levels be-
tween countries. The telephony/ICT index also shows up to be signicantly
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associated with lower levels of corruption. The following regression in Col-
umn 2 repeats the above specication, only with a sample of less developed
countries (sample size now reduced to 93 countries). This is to conrm that
the results of the relationship between mass media and corruption, and that
of telephony/ICT with corruption respectively, are not being driven by di¤er-
ences in developed and developing countries alone - the coe¢ cient is negative
and signicant still, though the explained variation has dropped signifcantly
to 22%. While the control of BUREAU remains signicant and of the same
sign, RULE is no longer signicant. To exclude the possibility that out-
liers may be driving the relationship, we restrict the sample to observations
with residuals with plus minus twice the standard deviations - the results
are again unchanged (a similar analysis is also undertaken in Brunetti et al
(2003)). Column 3 presents the two stage least squares, with instruments
for the mass media variable newspapers and telephony/ICT. We use press
freedom measures as compiled by Freedom House, 2003. Other measures of
press freedom compiled by other organisations have also been used, and the
results are robust to the di¤erent specications. Instruments for the Tel/ICT
index are lagged values of the index by 3 years. Column 3 reveals that the
results are robust - the results are the same as earlier, with slightly larger
(and signicant) co-e¢ cients for the two explanatory variables. Non-linear
specications have not resulted in greater t.
Column 4 presents the broader specication of the impact of other vari-
ables on corruption. We include other determinants of corruption along with
our principal explanatory variables of media variables and Tel/ICT index.
While both variables continue to have the same signs and are signicant,
the new explanatory variablese¤ects vary. The co-e¢ cient of log of GDP
per capita is negative and signicant, while that of education is not so. The
co-e¢ cients of the two variables that proxy for distortions in the economy
are both insignicant. Where TRADE has the expected positive sign, the
positive coe¢ cient of BLACK is unexpected. ETHNIC, the proxy for the
degree of cultural fractionalization also has the expected negative sign but
is insignicant. Column 5 presents the results for the sample size reduced
to those of LDCs only (93), where the relationship between corruption and
media variables, and Tel/ICT holds out with the correct signs and are signif-
icant, and the results for the controls remain the same as well. The controls
are no longer either of the expected signs or not signicant.
We nally test for another specication to check for di¤erences across
continents. We include dummies for continents of Africa, OECD countries
and Latin America - here we obtain the Latin American dummy to be sig-
nicant. We run the instrumented regression, and Column 7 presents the
results. The results are unchanged, though the signicance of both media
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and tel/ICT variables drops considerably.
There are issues concerning endogeneity. While the endogenous e¤ects
of telephony and ICT on corruption can be ruled out, and the standard
tests performed conrm this, that of press freedom and corruption cannot
be so. A potential criticism is that press freedom may be endogenous since
corrupt regimes may tend to limit press freedom. The latter is also addressed
in Brunetti (2003). A word to note regarding causality. Due to the lack
of perfect instruments and the short time series over which the study is
conducted, it is di¢ cult to establish robust causality. Several instruments as
available has been used, and all time series variation in the variables available
has been exploited to deal with the endogeneity.
In Table 3, we now discuss the results of the impact of media and Tel/ICT
variables on inequality. The dependent variable is the Gini coe¢ cient, ob-
tained from the Deninger and Squire (1996) database over the years 1994-
1996, and is updated with data from the new release of Ginis in the World
Income Inequality Database (2005). Robustness tests similar to the earlier
specications with corruption are undertaken. We split the sample into de-
veloped and less developed countries to observe whether the relationship is
driven by LDCs, or other outliers. We also use other measures of corrup-
tion and press freedom data for robustness. All t statistics are robust to
heteroscedasticity in residuals.
The basic specication that we are testing is as follows:
GINIi = 0 + 1MEDIAi + 2TEL=ICTindexi + 3Xit + i (3)
As for controls, to avoid any ambiguity we choose two sets of controls
used by Perotti (1996) and Barro (1999) as has been popularly used in the
inequality and growth literature (Banerjee et al 2002). This is because a
central concern for the empirical literature is that any of the right hand side
variables used as controls could proxy for omitted variables.The choice of
the variables entails judgements about causality that are hard to substan-
tiate. Therefore, we use an already established set of controls : those used
in Perotti (1996) and those used in Barro (1999). Specications empirically
tested for thus are repeated with two sets of controls. These specications
are useful benchmarks for two reasons. First, the Perotti specication has
been used by most subsequent studies. Second, they represent two extremes,
the Perotti specication using the smallest number of control variables and
the Barro specication the largest3. The Perotti specication excludes most
3The list of variables included in both specications are as follows: Perotti:
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variables (in particular, investment and government spending) through which
inequality could be a¤ected. The variables included are male and female ed-
ucation and the purchasing power parity of investment goods, a measure of
distortions. Barro, on the other hand, includes a much larger set of vari-
ables through which inequality could be a¤ected - investment share of GDP,
fertility, education and government spending. The interpretation of the co-
e¢ cients in two regressions is therefore slightly di¤erent. The results pre-
sented in Table 2 allow for both sets of controls. We choose the set of the
same 128 countries for which media and tel/ICT index data is available i.e.
the same set of countries as for the corruption data set.
Column 1 presents the basic specication - newspapers, radios and TVs
are signicantly associated with lower inequality. The Tel/ICT index is also
signicantly associated with inequality - increasing values of Tel/ICT are
associated with lower inequality. Column 2 presents the same specications
with only the set of developing countries (having excluded the same countries
as in the earlier "corruption" regressions. Here one nds an interesting change
in results. While the results for the media variables are unchanged, one
nds that the sign of the tel/ICT variable has switched. This has important
implications for the e¤ects of telecommunications and ICTs for developing
countries, a result to be discussed in greater detail later. Column 3 presents
the two stage least squares results using the same set of instruments for
the media variables and the Tel/ICT variables over the entire sample - the
results remain largely unchanged. Columns 4 and 5 introduce the two sets
of controls, the Perotti and Barro specications respectively. The results
are largely unchanged, and the mass media variable and Tel/ICT variables
are still negatively and signicantly associated with the Ginis, though their
e¤ects are less stronger as is in the case without the controls. Fit improves
with the inclusion of the controls, however at the expense of the explanatory
power of the main explanatory variable we are interested in. To conrm that
there are no regional e¤ects driving the results, we incorporate the continent
dummies for our last set of specications. None of the continent dummies
shows up as signicant.
Log(GDP(1990),PPP I (1990), male education (1990), female education (1990).
Barro: Log(GDP(1990)), log(GDP(1990)) squared, government consumption(1990-
1995), secondary and higher education(1990), fertility(1990), 1/30*(term of trade(1995)-
terms of trade(1990)), rule of law, democ(1990), democ(1990) squared, ination(1990-
1995), investsment share (1990-1995)
Instruments:
Barro Log(GDP(1990)), log(GDP(1990)) squared, government consumption(1990),
secondary education(1990), higher education(1990), fertility(1990), 1/30*(term of
trade(1995)-terms of trade(1990)), rule of law, democ(1990), democ(1990) squared, Span-
ish or Portuguese colony.
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The nal relationship that we will be investigating is for the impact of
these variables on poverty. The specication in main use is identical to that
above
POV ERTYi = 0 + 1MEDIAi + 2TEL=ICTindexi + 3Xit + i (4)
where Xit are the set of controls, which we will specify shortly. Poverty
is measured using the dollar a day denition of the World Bank. Data is
obtained from the World Bank indicatorsdatabase over the years 1994 -
2002. For this particular specication we only consider the sample of LDCs
that have been used in earlier specications in Tables 1 and 2. Here again we
use the same set of controls as determinants of poverty. For robustness we
will extract outliers using the same rule as earlier in Table 1, by excluding
those with residuals with plus minus twice the standard deviations.
In Table 4, Column 1 presents the basic specication with newspapers,
radios, and TVs as the main media variables, and the tel/ICT index as the
telephony variable. We nd that the newspapers variable shows up just about
signicant, with the correct sign (i.e. negatively correlated) with radios and
TVs not showing up as signicant. The t of the regression is also quite
poor. As a conrmatory test we run a second set with the entire sample
of countries (both developed and developing countries). The results show
up as similar to those obtained in the earlier specications - newspapers
show up as being negatively associated with poverty - the results for radios
and TVs is again insignicant, in Column 2. Column 3 presents the two
stage least squares results using the same instruments for newspapers and
for the tel/ICT index. Fit remains almost the same, though the signicance
of the newspapers variable improves. Tel/ICT index remains just signicant.
Columns 4 and 5 present the specifcations with the two sets of controls
- both Perotti and Barro sets. Fit signicantly improves, and the size of
the coe¢ cient of newspapers is slightly larger than the earlier specications.
Columns 6 and 7 includes continent dummies for the earlier specications in
Columns 3 and 4 with the Perotti and Barro controls. In both specications,
the dummies are, however, not signicant.
4 The non-linear relationship between inequal-
ity and ICT index
The results in Table 3, tabulating the regressions of inequality on mass me-
dia and ICT indicators established two sets of relationships. For develop-
ing countries, ICT is found to be inequality increasing, while for developed
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countries it is inequality decreasing. To a¢ rm this non-linear relationship
between inequality and the ICT index, I plot local average smoothers for the
ICT indices as a simple non-parametric tool which will allow us to specify
the particular non-linear nature of the relationship. Local average smoothers
of the ICT index are plotted for the three years 1992 to 1994, for both f1
and f2 (the rst two factors retained to act as indexes of ICT) in Figures 1
and 2. The plots reveal that increasing levels of ICT index are associated
with lower levels of inequality - this is clearly observed in all 3 plots. The
plots also shows signs of the formation of two "peaks" of which the peak
at low values of ICT is clearer and corresponds to lower levels of ICT and
high levels of inequality. This agrees with the earlier nding, that developing
countries (which typically have lower levels of investment in ICT relative to
richer countries) are associated with higher levels of inequality. This pattern
is again repeated for our second set of plots using the second factor f2 - gures
2. Here too, the inverse relationship between levels of ICT and inequality is
clearly revealed. For greater specication of the functional relationship, one
can undertake more detailed non-parametric methods, or investigate further
non-linear specications in the regressions earlier. The small data set, how-
ever, in this case, does not allow one to undertake further non-parametric
analyses in specifying the functional form. While a causal relationship is
di¢ cult to establish because of the lack of data, and requires a further set
of analyses beyond the current purview of the paper, it is clear that higher
levels of ICTs is associated with lower inequality.
5 Conclusion
There is an increasing dependence on the knowledge-based economy for eco-
nomic development and growth. Mass media and ICTs are two important
vehicles of information in developing countries. In this paper we present
evidence of some robust associations between some development outcomes
(namely corruption, inequality and poverty) and ICT and mass media. The
results strongly suggest that both mass media and ICT penetration are neg-
atively associated with corruption. This result holds across both the entire
sample (of both developed and developing countries), and only for developing
countries. Of the 3 media penetration variables, newspaper circulation holds
out most robustly under all specications The same result is also obtained
for the e¤ects of ICT and mass media on economic inequality, measured by
the Gini. However, ICT reveals itself inequality increasing for the develop-
ing country sample (robustness checks conrmed), but inequality decreasing
for the entire sample. Robustness checks are again performed for developing
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countries only, and for any outliers driving the results. Non-parametric plots
conrm this result. The nal set of tests uncover robust associations between
media (newspaper circulation) penetration and poverty.
The empirics derived in this paper are still associations and causality re-
mains di¢ cult to identify. This is due to the lack of appropriate data and
a short time series of ICT data in particular. However, with the empirical
literature still at its early stages, the evidence obtained is convincing that
there exists a clear and signicant association between media and communi-
cations infrastructures, and corruption, inequality and poverty in developing
economies.
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Variable name Abbreviation Years Source
Press Freedom Press 1994-2002 ICRG
Average quality of the bureaucracy Bureau 1982-1995 ICRG
Average Trade ((Export+Import) /GDP) Trade all years World Bank
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation Ethnic all years Easterly-Levine (1997)
Black market premium on foreign exchange Black 1974-1989 Picks Currency Yearbook
Average rule of law Rule 1982-1995 ICRG
Natural Log of GDP ln GDP all years World Bank
Education Literacy all years World Bank
Latin America dummy Latin America all years 
Africa dummy Africa all years 
OECD dummy OECD all years 
Table 1: Variables and sources
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS OLS (LDCs) IV OLS OLS(LDCs) OLS IV
Constant 1.97 2.4 1.68 2.05 2.65 1.4 1.2
(3.2) (4.2) (6.4) (6.2) (4.1) (3.67) (4.7)
Press -0.009 -0.012 -0.018 -0.021 -0.022 -0.014 -0.012
(-5.23) (-4.34) (-4.44) (-5.1) (-3.2) (-2.34) (-3.12)
Bureau 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.2 0.16 0.034 0.032
(-3.1) (-3) (-2.3) (-3.2) (-2.4) (-0.34) (-0.73)
Rule 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.014 0.14 0.2
(3.1) (2.7) (3.4) (4.2) (0.34) (0.2) (0.4)
Newspapers -0.02 -0.025 -0.028 -0.017 -0.02 -0.019 -0.023
(-2.34) (-3.3) (-3.2) (-2.5) (-2.2) (-1.9) -4.3
Radios -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.003 -0.06 -0.057
(-2.23) (-4.1) (-5.2) (-2.23) (-0.302) (-3.1) (-3)
TVs -0.008 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.56) (-1.2) (-1.4) (-1.3) (-2.06) (-0.78) (-0.64)
Tel/ICTIndex -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(-2.02) (-4.1) (-3.1) (-2.2) (-2.1) (-3.2) (-1.2)
ln GDP 0.096 0.152 0.094 0.089
(0.42) (0.53) (0.43) (0.62)
Literacy -0.062 -0.076 -0.054 -0.06
(-1.43) (-1.56) (-1.78) (-1.3)
Black 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
(1.2) (1.6) (1.3) (1.5)
Ethnic -0.2 -0.13 -0.45 -0.42
-1.4 1.2 -1.8 -0.67
Latin America -0.43 -0.52
(-2.34) (-2.77)
Africa -0.05 -0.05
(-0.13) (-0.67)
OECD 0.23 0.3
(1.2) (1.04)
N 120 93 98 64 42 64 64
Rsq 0.69 0.41 0.69 0.63 0.31 0.67 0.65
Table 2: OLS Regressions of Averaged Corruption 1994-1998
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Estimation Method 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Control Variables Perotti Barro Perotti Barro
Press -0.003 -0.009 -0.016 -0.034 -0.019 -0.009 -0.006
(-2.37) (-1.25) (-2.58) (-3.5) (-3.7) (-1.34) (-2.64)
Bureau 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.029 0.019
(-2.71) (-2.9) -2.7 -1.2 -2.7 -2.98 -1.33
Rule 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.021 0.048 0.015
(-3.9) (-1.9) (-3.7) (-2.9) (-1.22) (-1.7) (-0.32)
Newspapers -0.014 -0.018 -0.012 -0.029 -0.025 -0.027 -0.021
(-3.14) (-3.1) (-2.4) (-4.1) (-2.8) (-2.1) (-3.7)
Radios -0.01 -0.01 -0.016 -0.013 -0.009 -0.02 -0.012
(-2.59) (-3.4) (-4.7) (-3.27) (-1.32) (-2.1) (-1.2)
TVs -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.00018 -0.001 -0.0006
(-2.23) (-2.2) (-1.9) (-4.3) (-3.06) (-1.24) (-0.67)
Tel/ICTIndex -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-4.05) (4.5) (2.1) (-1.8) (-0.2) (-1.2) (-2.2)
ln GDP 0.18 0.132 -0.043 0.21
(0.432) (0.83) (-0.93) (0.93)
Literacy -0.047 -0.17 -0.154 -0.06
(-1.23) (-0.72) (-1.10) (-.53)
Black 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(1.05) (0.87) (0.32) (1.5)
Ethnic -0.36 0.19 -0.52 -0.24
(-1.4) (0.67) (-1) (-0.67)
Latin America -0.23 -0.32
(-1.06) -0.87
Africa -0.02 -0.03
(-0.61) (-0.27)
OECD -0.23 -0.3
(-1.02) (-0.9)
N 120 93 98 64 42 64 64
Rsq 0.63 0.34 0.58 0.61 0.28 0.59 0.62
Table 3: OLS Regressions of Gini Index 1994-1998, for both developed and
developing countries 22
Dependent variable Poverty
Estimation Method 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Control Variables Perotti Barro Perotti Barro
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Press -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012 -0.017 -0.009 -0.005
(-3.29) (-3.65) (-2.02) (-5.55) (-4.6) (-2.03) (-2.04)
Bureau 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.08
(-3.9) (-4) -2.67 -5.2 -2.4 -0.94 -0.88
Rule 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.019 0.15 0.14
(-4.1) (-4.7) (-3.9) (-2.2) (-1.34) (-2.2) (-1.4)
Newspapers -0.02 -0.015 -0.019 -0.011 -0.017 -0.009 -0.012
(-3.39) (-2.3) (-4.9) (-3.2) (-3.6) (-2.9) (-4.1)
Radios -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.012 -0.034 -0.014
(-1.03) (-1.1) (-2.2) (-2.37) (-1.31) (-2.2) (-3.1)
TVs -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.29) (-0.2) (-1.9) (-1.1) (-1.76) (-1.03) (-1.6)
Tel/ICTIndex -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(-2.19) (-2.1) (-3.5) (-3.76) (-2.89) (-3.9) (-1.9)
ln GDP 0.087 0.234 0.124 0.145
(0.72) (0.67) (0.36) (0.72)
Literacy -0.012 -0.046 -0.024 -0.036
(-0.47) (-0.96) (-0.88) (-0.73)
Black 0.0002 0.0009 0.0007 0.0004
(0.89) (0.78) (1.1) (1.2)
Ethnic -0.2 -0.13 -0.45 -0.42
(-1.8) (-1.5) (-0.88) (-0.77)
Latin America -0.25 -0.72
(-1.24) (-1.22)
Africa -0.23 -0.24
(-0.26) (-0.67)
OECD 0.29 0.3
1.4 0.89
N 93 120 98 64 42 64 64
Rsq 0.4 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.31 0.38 0.44
Table 4: OLS Regressions of Poverty, for only developing countries
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Fig. 1a Non-parametric plot of relationship between gini and 
ICT index (f1) for 1992 
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Fig. 1b Non-parametric plot of relationship between gini and 
ICT index (f1) for 1993 
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Fig 1c. Non-parametric plot of relationship between gini and 
ICT index (f1) for 1994 
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Fig 2a. Non-parametric plot of relationship between gini and 
ICT index (f2) for 1992 
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Fig 2b. Non-parametric plot of relationship between gini and 
ICT index (f2) for 1993 
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Fig 2c. Non-parametric plot of relationship between gini and 
ICT index (f2) for 1994 
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